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Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2001
Summary
These revised recommendations regarding vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine
update the previous Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
recommendations (MMWR 1991;40; No. RR-14:1–10) and include current
information regarding the nonemergency use of vaccinia vaccine among
laboratory and health-care workers occupationally exposed to vaccinia virus,
recombinant vaccinia viruses, and other Orthopoxviruses that can infect humans.
In addition, this report contains ACIP’s recommendations for the use of vaccinia
vaccine if smallpox (variola) virus were used as an agent of biological terrorism or
if a smallpox outbreak were to occur for another unforeseen reason.
INTRODUCTION
Variola virus is the etiological agent of smallpox. During the smallpox era, the only
known reservoir for the virus was humans; no known animal or insect reservoirs or
vectors existed. The most frequent mode of transmission was person-to-person, spread
through direct deposit of infective droplets onto the nasal, oral, or pharyngeal mucosal
membranes, or the alveoli of the lungs from close, face-to-face contact with an infectious
person. Indirect spread (i.e., not requiring face-to-face contact with an infectious person)
through fine-particle aerosols or a fomite containing the virus was less common (1,2 ).
Symptoms of smallpox begin 12–14 days (range: 7–17) after exposure, starting with
a 2–3 day prodrome of high fever, malaise, and prostration with severe headache and
backache. This preeruptive stage is followed by the appearance of a maculopapular rash
(i.e., eruptive stage) that progresses to papules 1–2 days after the rash appears; vesicles
appear on the fourth or fifth day; pustules appear by the seventh day; and scab lesions
appear on the fourteenth day (Figures 1,2) (3 ). The rash appears first on the oral mucosa,
face, and forearms, then spreads to the trunk and legs (3,4 ). Lesions might erupt on the
palms and soles as well. Smallpox skin lesions are deeply embedded in the dermis and
feel like firm round objects embedded in the skin. As the skin lesions heal, the scabs
separate and pitted scarring gradually develops (Figure 2) (4 ). Smallpox patients are
most infectious during the first week of the rash when the oral mucosa lesions ulcerate
and release substantial amounts of virus into the saliva. A patient is no longer infectious
after all scabs have separated (i.e., 3–4 weeks after the onset of the rash).
During the smallpox era, overall mortality rates were approximately 30%. Other less
common but more severe forms of smallpox included a) flat-type smallpox with a mortal-
ity rate >96% and characterized by severe toxemia and flat, velvety, confluent lesions
that did not progress to the pustular stage; and b) hemorrhagic-type smallpox, character-
ized by severe prodromal symptoms, toxemia, and a hemorrhagic rash that was almost
always fatal, with death occurring 5–6 days after rash onset (4 ).
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FIGURE 2. Progression of smallpox lesions from, left to right, pustules to scabs to scars
Source: Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z, Ladnyi ID. Smallpox and its eradication.
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO), 1988. Reprinted with permission
from WHO.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp> (accessed April 20, 2001).
FIGURE 1. Man with smallpox
Source: CDC/Public Health Images Library, identification no. 131. Photographer: Barbara
Rice. Available at <http://phil.cdc.gov/Phil/>; accessed on May 16, 2001.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp> (accessed April 20, 2001).
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Vaccinia vaccine is a highly effective immunizing agent that enabled the global eradi-
cation of smallpox. The last naturally occurring case of smallpox occurred in Somalia in
1977. In May 1980, the World Health Assembly certified that the world was free of
naturally occurring smallpox (5 ). By the 1960s, because of vaccination programs and
quarantine regulations, the risk for importation of smallpox into the United States had
been reduced. As a result, recommendations for routine smallpox vaccination were
rescinded in 1971 (6 ). In 1976, the recommendation for routine smallpox vaccination of
health-care workers was also discontinued (7 ). In 1982, the only active licensed producer
of vaccinia vaccine in the United States discontinued production for general use, and in
1983, distribution to the civilian population was discontinued (8 ). All military personnel
continued to be vaccinated, but that practice ceased in 1990. Since January 1982, small-
pox vaccination has not been required for international travelers, and International Cer-
tificates of Vaccination forms no longer include a space to record smallpox vaccination
(9 ).
In 1980, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended
the use of vaccinia vaccine to protect laboratory workers from possible infection while
working with nonvariola Orthopoxviruses (e.g., vaccinia and monkeypox) (10 ). In 1984,
those recommendations were included in guidelines for biosafety in microbiological and
biomedical laboratories (11 ). The guidelines expanded the recommendations to include
persons working in animal-care areas where studies with Orthopoxviruses were being
conducted. They further recommended that such workers have documented evidence of
satisfactory smallpox vaccination within the preceding 3 years. CDC has provided vac-
cinia vaccine for these laboratory workers since 1983 (12 ). In 1991, ACIP further ex-
panded smallpox vaccination recommendations to include health-care workers involved
in clinical trials using recombinant vaccinia virus vaccines and lengthened the recom-
mendations for revaccination for persons working with vaccinia virus, recombinant vac-
cinia viruses, or other nonvariola Orthopoxviruses to every 10 years (13 ).
Currently, international concern is heightened regarding the potential use of small-
pox (variola) virus as a bioterrorism agent (14,15 ). Because of these concerns, ACIP has
developed recommendations for vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine regarding the potential use
of smallpox virus as a biological weapon. Additionally, recommendations regarding vac-
cination of persons working with highly attenuated strains or recombinant vaccines de-
rived from highly attenuated strains of vaccinia virus have been revised.
VACCINIA VACCINE
Dryvax,® the vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine currently licensed in the United States, is a
lyophilized, live-virus preparation of infectious vaccinia virus (Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,
Marietta, Pennsylvania). Vaccinia vaccine does not contain smallpox (variola) virus. Pre-
viously, the vaccine had been prepared from calf lymph with a seed virus derived from
the New York City Board of Health (NYCBOH) strain of vaccinia virus and has a minimum
concentration of 108 pock-forming units (PFU)/ml. Vaccine was administered by using the
multiple-puncture technique with a bifurcated needle. A reformulated vaccine, produced
by using cell-culture techniques, is now being developed.
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Vaccine Efficacy
Neutralizing antibodies induced by vaccinia vaccine are genus-specific and cross-
protective for other Orthopoxviruses (e.g., monkeypox, cowpox, and variola viruses)
(16–18 ). Although the efficacy of vaccinia vaccine has never been measured precisely
during controlled trials, epidemiologic studies demonstrate that an increased level of
protection against smallpox persists for <5 years after primary vaccination and substan-
tial but waning immunity can persist for >10 years (19,20 ). Antibody levels after revac-
cination can remain high longer, conferring a greater period of immunity than occurs
after primary vaccination alone (3,19 ). Administration of vaccinia vaccine within the first
days after initial exposure to smallpox virus can reduce symptoms or prevent smallpox
disease (2–4 ).
Although the level of antibody that protects against smallpox infection is unknown,
after percutaneous administration of a standard dose of vaccinia vaccine, >95% of pri-
mary vaccinees (i.e., persons receiving their first dose of vaccine) will experience neu-
tralizing or hemagglutination inhibition antibody at a titer of >1:10 (21 ). Neutralizing
antibody titers of >1:10 persist among 75% of persons for 10 years after receiving sec-
ond doses and <30 years after receiving three doses of vaccine (22,23 ). The level of
antibody required for protection against vaccinia virus infection is unknown also. How-
ever, when lack of local skin response to revaccination with an appropriately adminis-
tered and potent vaccine dose is used as an indication of immunity, <10% of persons with
neutralizing titers of >1:10 exhibit a primary-type response at revaccination, compared
with >30% of persons with titers <1:10 (24 ). Lack of major or primary-type reaction can
indicate the presence of neutralizing antibody levels sufficient to prevent viral replica-
tion, although it can also indicate unsuccessful vaccination because of improper adminis-
tration or less potent vaccine.
Recombinant Vaccinia Viruses
Vaccinia virus is the prototype of the genus Orthopoxvirus. It is a double-stranded
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) virus that has a broad host range under experimental con-
ditions but is rarely isolated from animals outside the laboratory (25,26 ). Multiple strains
of vaccinia virus exist that have different levels of virulence for humans and animals. For
example, the Temple of Heaven and Copenhagen vaccinia strains are highly pathogenic
among animals, whereas the NYCBOH strain, from which the Wyeth vaccine strain was
derived, had relatively low pathogenicity (3 ).
Vaccinia virus can be genetically engineered to contain and express foreign DNA with
or without impairing the ability of the virus to replicate. Such foreign DNA can encode
protein antigens that induce protection against one or more infectious agents. Recombi-
nant vaccinia viruses have been engineered to express immunizing antigens of herpes-
virus, hepatitis B, rabies, influenza, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and other
viruses (27–32 ).
Recombinant vaccinia viruses have been created from different strains of vaccinia
virus. In the United States, recombinants have been made from a nonattenuated NYCBOH
strain, or a mouse neuroadapted derivative, the WR strain. Recombinants have also
been made by using the Copenhagen and Lister vaccinia strains, which are more patho-
genic among animals than the NYCBOH strain. Additionally, certain highly attenuated,
host-restricted, non- or poorly replicating poxvirus strains have been developed for use
as substrates in recombinant vaccine development. These strains include the
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TABLE 1. Highly attenuated poxvirus strains used for recombinant vaccine
development
 Strain  Parent virus strain  Biosafety level
 MVA  Vaccinia virus (Ankara)  2
 NYVAC  Vaccinia virus (Copenhagen)  1
 TROVAC  Fowlpox virus  1
 ALVAC  Canarypox virus  1
Orthopoxviruses, modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA) and NYVAC (derived from the
Copenhagen vaccinia strain), and the Avipoxviruses, ALVAC and TROVAC (derived from
canarypox and fowlpox viruses, respectively) (33–36 ) (Table 1).
Animal studies indicate that recombinants are less pathogenic than the parent strain
of vaccinia virus (37 ). Laboratory-acquired infections with nonhighly attenuated vac-
cinia and recombinant viruses derived from nonhighly attenuated vaccinia strains have
been reported (38–41 ). However, highly attenuated poxvirus strains (MVA, NYVAC,
ALVAC, and TROVAC) are unable to replicate (MVA, ALVAC, and TROVAC) or replicate
poorly (NYVAC) in mammalian host cells; therefore, highly attenuated poxvirus strains
do not create productive infections (36 ).
These highly attenuated strains have also been reported to be avirulent among nor-
mal and immunosuppressed animals (MVA, NYVAC, ALVAC, or TROVAC) and safe among
humans (MVA) (33,35,42,43 ). Although no formal surveillance system has been estab-
lished to monitor laboratory workers, no laboratory-acquired infections resulting from
exposure to these highly attenuated strains or recombinant vaccines derived from these
strains have been reported in the scientific literature or to CDC. Because of the biological
properties and accumulated attenuation data for NYVAC, ALVAC, and TROVAC, the Re-
combinant DNA Advisory Committee of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reduced
the biosafety level for these viruses to biosafety level 1 (44 ). The Occupational Safety
and Health Board of NIH no longer requires vaccinia (smallpox) vaccination for person-
nel manipulating MVA or NYVAC in a laboratory where no other vaccinia viruses are
being manipulated (45 ).
During human trials of recombinant vaccines, physicians, nurses, and other health-
care personnel who provide clinical care to recipients of these vaccines could be ex-
posed to both vaccinia and recombinant viruses. This exposure could occur from contact
with dressings contaminated with the virus or through exposure to the vaccine. Although
the risk for transmission of recombinant vaccinia viruses to exposed health-care work-
ers is unknown, no reports of transmission to health-care personnel from vaccine recipi-
ents have been published. If appropriate infection-control precautions are observed
(46,47 ), health-care workers are at less risk for infection than laboratory workers be-
cause of the smaller volume and lower titer of virus in clinical specimens compared with
laboratory material. However, the potential does exist of nonhighly attenuated vaccinia
viruses or recombinant viruses derived from these strains being transmitted to health-
care personnel. Therefore, those workers who have direct contact with contaminated
dressings or other infectious material from volunteers in clinical studies where such
strains are used can be offered vaccination. Vaccination is not indicated for health-care
personnel who are exposed to clinical materials contaminated with highly attenuated
poxvirus strains used to develop vaccine recombinants.
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Laboratory and other health-care personnel who work with highly attenuated strains
of vaccinia virus (e.g., MVA and NYVAC) do not require routine vaccinia vaccination.
Laboratory and other health-care personnel who work with the Avipoxvirus strains
ALVAC and TROVAC also do not require routine vaccinia vaccination because these
viruses do not grow in mammalian cells and, therefore, do not produce clinical infections
among humans. In addition, antibodies induced by vaccinia vaccine are genus-specific
(16 ) and would probably not inhibit the expression of genes incorporated into recombi-
nant vaccines derived from ALVAC and TROVAC. Therefore, vaccination would provide
no theoretical benefit in preventing seroconversion to the foreign antigen expressed by
a recombinant virus if an inadvertent exposure occurred. Laboratory and other health-
care personnel who work with viral cultures or other infective materials should always
observe appropriate biosafety guidelines and adhere to published infection-control pro-
cedures (46–48 ).
Routine Nonemergency Vaccine Use
Vaccinia vaccine is recommended for laboratory workers who directly handle a) cul-
tures or b) animals contaminated or infected with, nonhighly attenuated vaccinia virus,
recombinant vaccinia viruses derived from nonhighly attenuated vaccinia strains, or
other Orthopoxviruses that infect humans (e.g., monkeypox, cowpox, vaccinia, and vari-
ola). Other health-care workers (e.g., physicians and nurses) whose contact with
nonhighly attenuated vaccinia viruses is limited to contaminated materials (e.g., dress-
ings) but who adhere to appropriate infection control measures are at lower risk for
inadvertent infection than laboratory workers. However, because a theoretical risk for
infection exists, vaccination can be offered to this group. Vaccination is not recommended
for persons who do not directly handle nonhighly attenuated virus cultures or materials
or who do not work with animals contaminated or infected with these viruses.
Vaccination with vaccinia vaccine results in high seroconversion rates and only infre-
quent adverse events (see Side Effects and Adverse Reactions). Recipients of standard
potency vaccinia vaccine (Dryvax) receive controlled percutaneous doses (approxi-
mately 2.5 × 105 PFU [3 ]) of relatively low pathogenicity vaccinia virus. The resulting
immunity should provide protection to recipients against infections resulting from uncon-
trolled, inadvertent inoculation by unusual routes (e.g., the eye) with a substantial dose of
virus of higher or unknown pathogenicity. In addition, persons with preexisting immunity
to vaccinia might be protected against seroconversion to the foreign antigen expressed
by a recombinant virus if inadvertently exposed (41 ). However, persons with preexisting
immunity to vaccinia might not receive the full benefit of recombinant vaccinia vaccines
developed for immunization against other infections (31,49 ).
Routine Nonemergency Revaccination
According to data regarding the persistence of neutralizing antibody after vaccina-
tion, persons working with nonhighly attenuated vaccinia viruses, recombinant viruses
developed from nonhighly attenuated vaccinia viruses, or other nonvariola
Orthopoxviruses should be revaccinated at least every 10 years (13 ). To ensure an
increased level of protection against more virulent nonvariola Orthopoxviruses (e.g.,
monkeypox), empiric revaccination every 3 years can be considered (17 ).
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FIGURE 3. Vaccine site major reaction and progression after primary smallpox vaccina-
tion or revaccination after a prolonged period between vaccinations, using multiple-
puncture technique
Source: CDC
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp> (accessed April 20, 2001).
Side Effects and Adverse Reactions
Vaccine Recipients
Side Effects and Less Severe Adverse Reactions. In a nonimmune person who is not
immunosuppressed, the expected response to primary vaccination is the development
of a papule at the site of vaccination 2–5 days after percutaneous administration of
vaccinia vaccine. The papule becomes vesicular, then pustular, and reaches its maxi-
mum size in 8–10 days. The pustule dries and forms a scab, which separates within 14–21
days after vaccination, leaving a scar (Figure 3). Primary vaccination can produce swell-
ing and tenderness of regional lymph nodes, beginning 3–10 days after vaccination and
persisting for 2–4 weeks after the skin lesion has healed. Maximum viral shedding from
the vaccination site occurs 4–14 days after vaccination, but vaccinia can be recovered
from the site until the scab separates from the skin (50 ).
A fever is also common after the vaccine is administered. Approximately 70% of
children experience >1 days of temperatures >100 F for 4–14 days after primary vacci-
nation (21 ), and 15%–20% of children experience temperatures >102 F. After revaccina-
tion, 35% of children experience temperatures >100 F, and 5% experience temperatures
of >102 F (24 ). Fever is less common among adults after vaccination or revaccination
(CDC, unpublished data, undated).
Inadvertent inoculation at other sites is the most frequent complication of vaccinia
vaccination and accounts for approximately half of all complications of primary vaccina-
tion and revaccination (Tables 2,3). Inadvertent inoculation usually results from autoin-
oculation of vaccinia virus transferred from the site of vaccination. The most common
sites involved are the face, eyelid, nose, mouth, genitalia, and rectum (Figure 4). Most
lesions heal without specific therapy, but vaccinia immunoglobulin (VIG) can be useful for
cases of ocular implantation (see Treatment for Vaccinia Vaccine Complications). How-
ever, if vaccinial keratitis is present, VIG is contraindicated because it might increase
corneal scarring (51 ).
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TABLE 3. Rates of reported complications* associated with vaccinia vaccinations†
(cases/million vaccinations)
Age (yrs) Inadvertent Generalized Eczema Progressive Postvaccinial
and status  inoculation§  vaccinia   vaccinatum  vaccinia¶  encephalitis   Total**
Primary vaccination
<1  507.0  394.4  14.1  —††  42.3  1549.3
1–4  577.3  233.4  44.2  3.2  9.5  1261.8
5–19  371.2  139.7  34.9  —††  8.7  855.9
>20  606.1  212.1  30.3  —††  —††  1515.2
Overall rates††  529.2  241.5  38.5  1.5  12.3  1253.8
Revaccination
<1 —††  —††  —††  —††  —††  —††
1–4  109.1  —††  —††  —††  —††  200.0
5–19  47.7  9.9  2.0  —††  —††  85.5
>20  25.0  9.1  4.5  6.8  4.5  113.6
Overall rates§§  42.1  9.0  3.0  3.0  2.0  108.2
* See text for descriptions of complications.
† Adapted from Lane JM, Ruben FL, Neff JM, Millar JD. Complications of smallpox vaccination, 1968: results of ten
statewide surveys. J Infect Dis 1970;122:303–9.
§ Referenced as accidental implantation.
¶ Referenced as vaccinia necrosum.
** Rates of overall complications by age group include complications not provided in this table, including severe
local reactions, bacterial superinfection of the vaccination site, and erythema multiforme.
†† No instances of this complication were identified during the 1968 10-state survey.
§§ Overall rates for each complication include persons of unknown age.
TABLE 2.Vaccine adverse reactions and vaccinia immunoglobulin (VIG)  indications
Adverse reactions  VIG treatment
Mild to moderate
Inadvertent inoculation Usually not required; might be indicated
     for ocular implantation*
Erythematous or urticarial rashes  Not indicated†
Bullous erythema multiforme
     (Stevens-Johnson syndrome)  Not indicated†
Moderate to severe
Eczema vaccinatum Indicated in severe cases
Generalized vaccinia Usually not required but might be
indicated if patient is severely ill or has
serious underlying illness
Progressive vaccinia (vaccinia necrosum) Might be effective, depending on immune
defect
Postvaccinial encephalitits Not indicated†
Vaccinial keratitis Contraindicated*
* VIG contraindicated if vaccinial keratitis present because increased scarring can occur.
† VIG is not effective in treatment of these adverse reactions.
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FIGURE 4. Inadvertent autoinoculation of lower eyelid with vaccinia virus
Source: Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z, Ladnyi ID. Smallpox and its eradication.
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO), 1988. Reprinted with permission
from WHO.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp.> (accessed April 20, 2001).
FIGURE 5. Eczema vaccinatum
Source: John M. Leedom, M.D.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp.> (accessed April 20, 2001).
Erythematous or urticarial rashes can occur approximately 10 days after primary
vaccination and can be confused with generalized vaccinia. However, the vaccinee is
usually afebrile with this reaction, and the rash resolves spontaneously within 2–4 days.
Rarely, bullous erythema multiforme (i.e., Stevens-Johnson syndrome) occurs (52 ).
Moderate to Severe Adverse Reactions. Moderate and severe complications of vac-
cinia vaccination include eczema vaccinatum, generalized vaccinia, progressive vac-
cinia, and postvaccinial encephalitis (Table 2). These complications are rare but occur
>10 times more often among primary vaccinees than among revaccinees and are more
frequent among infants than among older children and adults (53–55 ) (Table 3). A study
of Israeli military recruits aged >18 years, who were vaccinated during 1991–1996,
reported rates of the severe complications progressive vaccinia (i.e., vaccinia necrosum
rate: 0/10,000 vaccinees) and postvaccinial encephalitis (rate: 0/10,000 vaccinees) simi-
lar to those reported in previous studies (56 ).
Eczema vaccinatum is a localized or systemic dissemination of vaccinia virus among
persons who have eczema or a history of eczema or other chronic or exfoliative skin
conditions (e.g., atopic dermatitis) (Figure 5). Usually, illness is mild and self-limited but
can be severe or fatal. The most serious cases among vaccine recipients occur among
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FIGURE 7. Generalized vaccinia in an otherwise healthy child; the child recovered with-
out sequelae
Photographer: John M. Leedom, M.D.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp.> (accessed April 20, 2001).
FIGURE 6. Eczema vaccinatum resulting from contact with recently vaccinated child;
patient recovered without sequelae or permanent ocular damage
Photographer: John M. Leedom, M.D.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp.> (accessed April 20, 2001).
primary vaccinees and are independent of the activity of the underlying eczema (57 ).
Severe cases have been observed also after contact of recently vaccinated persons with
persons who have active eczema or a history of eczema (see Contacts of Vaccinees)
(Figure 6).
Generalized vaccinia is characterized by a vesicular rash of varying extent that can
occur among persons without underlying illnesses (Figure 7). The rash is generally self-
limited and requires minor or no therapy except among patients whose conditions might
be toxic or who have serious underlying immunosuppressive illnesses (e.g., acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome [AIDS]) (58 ).
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FIGURE 8. Progressive vaccinia (vaccinia necrosum), which was fatal, in a child with an
immunodeficiency
Source: Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z, Ladnyi ID. Smallpox and its eradication.
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO), 1988. Reprinted with permission
from WHO.
* Additional smallpox images are available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Smallpox/
Smallpox.asp.> (accessed April 20, 2001).
Progressive vaccinia (vaccinia necrosum) is a severe, potentially fatal illness charac-
terized by progressive necrosis in the area of vaccination, often with metastatic lesions
(Figure 8). It has occurred almost exclusively among persons with cellular immunodefi-
ciency. The most serious complication is postvaccinial encephalitis. In the majority of
cases, it affects primary vaccinees aged <1 year or adolescents and adults receiving a
primary vaccination (3 ). Occurrence of this complication was influenced by the strain of
vaccine virus and was higher in Europe than in the United States. The principle strain of
vaccinia virus used in the United States, NYCBOH, was associated with the lowest inci-
dence of postvaccinial encephalitis (3 ). Approximately 15%–25% of affected vaccinees
with this complication die, and 25% have permanent neurological sequelae (52–54 ).
Fatal complications caused by vaccinia vaccination are rare, with approximately 1 death/
million primary vaccinations and 0.25 deaths/million revaccinations (54 ). Death is most
often the result of postvaccinial encephalitis or progressive vaccinia.
Contacts of Vaccinees
Transmission of vaccinia virus can occur when a recently vaccinated person has
contact with a susceptible person. In a 1968 10-state survey of complications of vaccinia
vaccination, the risk for transmission to contacts was 27 infections/million total vaccina-
tions; 44% of those contact cases occurred among children aged <5 years (53 ). Before
the U.S. military discontinued routine smallpox vaccination in 1990, occurrences of con-
tact transmission of vaccinia virus from recently vaccinated military recruits had been
reported, including six cases resulting from transmission from one vaccine recipient (59–
61 ).
Approximately 60% of contact transmissions reported in the 1968 10-state survey
resulted in inadvertent inoculation of otherwise healthy persons. Approximately 30% of
the eczema vaccinatum cases reported in that study were a result of contact transmis-
sion (53 ). Eczema vaccinatum might be more severe among contacts than among vacci-
nated persons, possibly because of simultaneous multiple inoculations at several sites
(54,62 ). Contact transmission rarely results in postvaccinial encephalitis or vaccinia
necrosum.
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TABLE 4. Vaccination contraindications and precautions for nonemergency
and emergency use contraindications*
Contraindications for Contraindications
nonemergency vaccine use during smallpox emergency
History or presence of eczema† Exposure to smallpox virus — no
     contraindications
Other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin No virus exposure — same contraindications
    conditions†§      as nonemergency use
Immunosuppression†¶ —
Pregnancy† —
Aged <18 yrs —
Vaccine component allergy —
* See text for explanation.
† Vaccination also not recommended for persons who live in household with others who have these conditions.
§ Vaccination may be administered after condition resolves.
¶ Conditions include human immunodeficiency virus, acquired immunodeficinecy syndrome, leukemia, lymphoma,
generalized malignancy, solid organ transplantation, cellular or humoral immunodeficiencies, or therapy with
alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or high-dose corticosteroids.
Precautions and Contraindications
Routine Nonemergency Laboratory and Health-Care Worker
Contraindications
The following contraindications to vaccination apply to routine nonemergency use of
vaccinia vaccine (see Smallpox Vaccine for Bioterrorism Preparedness for information
regarding precautions and contraindications to vaccination during a smallpox outbreak
emergency) (Table 4). Before administering vaccinia vaccine, the physician should com-
plete a thorough patient history to document the absence of vaccination contraindications
among both vaccinees and their household contacts. Efforts should be made to identify
vaccinees and their household contacts who have eczema, a history of eczema, or immu-
nodeficiencies. Vaccinia vaccine should not be administered for routine nonemergency
indications if these conditions are present among either recipients or their household
contacts.
History or Presence of Eczema or Other Skin Conditions
Because of the increased risk for eczema vaccinatum, vaccinia vaccine should not be
administered to persons with eczema of any degree, those with a past history of eczema,
those whose household contacts have active eczema, or whose household contacts have
a history of eczema. Persons with other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions (e.g.,
atopic dermatitis, burns, impetigo, or varicella zoster) might also be at higher risk for
eczema vaccinatum and should not be vaccinated until the condition resolves.
Pregnancy
Live-viral vaccines are contraindicated during pregnancy; therefore, vaccinia vac-
cine should not be administered to pregnant women for routine nonemergency indica-
tions. However, vaccinia vaccine is not known to cause congenital malformations (63 ).
Although <50 cases of fetal vaccinia infection have been reported, vaccinia virus has
been reported to cause fetal infection on rare occasions, almost always after primary
vaccination of the mother (64 ). Cases have been reported as recently as 1978 (55,65 ).
When fetal vaccinia does occur, it usually results in stillbirth or death of the infant soon
after delivery.
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Altered Immunocompetence
Replication of vaccinia virus can be enhanced among persons with immunodeficiency
diseases and among those with immunosuppression (e.g., as occurs with leukemia, lym-
phoma, generalized malignancy, solid organ transplantation, cellular or humoral immu-
nity disorders, or therapy with alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or high-dose
corticosteroid therapy [i.e., >2 mg/kg body weight or 20 mg/day of prednisone for >2
weeks] [66 ]). Persons with immunosuppression also include hematopoietic stem cell
transplant recipients who are <24 months posttransplant, and hematopoietic stem cell
transplant recipients who are >24 months posttransplant but who have graft-versus-
host disease or disease relapse. Persons with such conditions or whose household con-
tacts have such conditions should not be administered vaccinia vaccine.
Persons Infected with HIV
Risk for severe complications after vaccinia vaccination for persons infected with HIV
is unknown. One case of severe generalized vaccinia has been reported involving an
asymptomatic HIV-infected military recruit after the administration of multiple vaccines
that included vaccinia vaccine (58 ). Additionally, a 1991 report indicated that two HIV-
infected persons might have died of a progressive vaccinia-like illness after treatment
with inactivated autologous lymphocytes infected with a recombinant HIV-vaccinia virus
(67 ). No evidence exists that smallpox vaccination accelerates the progression of HIV-
related disease. However, the degree of immunosuppression that would place an HIV-
infected person at greater risk for adverse events is unknown. Because of this uncertainty,
until additional information becomes available, not vaccinating persons (under routine
nonemergency conditions) who have HIV infection is advisable.
Infants and Children
Before the eradication of smallpox, vaccinia vaccination was administered routinely
during childhood. However, smallpox vaccination is no longer indicated for infants or
children for routine nonemergency indications.
Persons with Allergies to Vaccine Components
The currently available vaccinia vaccine (i.e., Dryvax) contains trace amounts of
polymyxin B sulfate, streptomycin sulfate, chlortetracycline hydrochloride, and neomy-
cin sulfate. Persons who experience anaphylactic reactions (i.e., hives, swelling of the
mouth and throat, difficulty breathing, hypotension, and shock) to any of these antibiotics
should not be vaccinated. Vaccinia vaccine does not contain penicillin. Future supplies of
vaccinia vaccine will be reformulated and might contain other preservatives or stabiliz-
ers. Refer to the manufacturer’s package insert for additional information.
Treatment for Vaccinia Vaccine Complications
Using VIG
The only product currently available for treatment of complications of vaccinia vacci-
nation is VIG, which is an isotonic sterile solution of the immunoglobulin fraction of plasma
from persons vaccinated with vaccinia vaccine. It is effective for treatment of eczema
vaccinatum and certain cases of progressive vaccinia; it might be useful also in the
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treatment of ocular vaccinia resulting from inadvertent implantation (68,69 ). However,
VIG is contraindicated for the treatment of vaccinial keratitis (51,54 ). VIG is recom-
mended for severe generalized vaccinia if the patient is extremely ill or has a serious
underlying disease. VIG provides no benefit in the treatment of postvaccinial encephalitis
and has no role in the treatment of smallpox. Current supplies of VIG are limited, and its
use should be reserved for treatment of vaccine complications with serious clinical mani-
festations (e.g., eczema vaccinatum, progressive vaccinia, severe generalized vaccinia,
and severe ocular viral implantation) (Table 2).
The recommended dosage of the currently available VIG for treatment of complica-
tions is 0.6 ml/kg of body weight. VIG must be administered intramuscularly and should
be administered as early as possible after the onset of symptoms. Because therapeutic
doses of VIG might be substantial (e.g., 42 ml for a person weighing 70 kg), the product
should be administered in divided doses over a 24- to 36-hour period. Doses can be
repeated, usually at intervals of 2–3 days, until recovery begins (e.g., no new lesions
appear). Future reformulations of VIG might require intravenous administration, and
health-care providers should refer to the manufacturer’s package insert for correct dos-
ages and route of administration. CDC is currently the only source of VIG for civilians (see
Vaccinia Vaccine Availability for contact information).
Other Treatment Options for Vaccinia Vaccine Complications
The Food and Drug Administration has not approved the use of any antiviral com-
pound for the treatment of vaccinia virus infections or other Orthopoxvirus infections,
including smallpox. Certain antiviral compounds have been reported to be active against
vaccinia virus or other Orthopoxviruses in vitro and among test animals (70–75 ). How-
ever, the safety and effectiveness of these compounds for treating vaccinia vaccination
complications or other Orthopoxvirus infections among humans is unknown. Questions
also remain regarding the effective dose and the timing and length of administration of
these antiviral compounds. Insufficient information exists on which to base recommen-
dations for any antiviral compound to treat postvaccination complications or
Orthopoxvirus infections, including smallpox. However, additional information could be-
come available, and health-care providers should consult CDC to obtain up-dated infor-
mation regarding treatment options for smallpox vaccination complications (see
Consultation Regarding Complications of Vaccinia Vaccine).
Consultation Regarding Complications of Vaccinia Vaccine
CDC can assist physicians in the diagnosis and management of patients with sus-
pected complications of vaccinia vaccination. VIG is available when indicated. Physicians
should telephone CDC at (404) 639-3670 during Mondays–Fridays, except holidays, or
(404) 639-3311 during evenings, weekends, and holidays. Health-care workers are re-
quested to report complications of vaccinia vaccination to the Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System at (800) 822-7967, or to their state or local health department.
PREVENTING CONTACT TRANSMISSION OF VACCINIA VIRUS
Vaccinia virus can be cultured from the site of primary vaccination beginning at the
time of development of a papule (i.e., 2–5 days after vaccination) until the scab separates
from the skin lesion (i.e., 14–21 days after vaccination). During that time, care must be
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taken to prevent spread of the virus to another area of the body or to another person by
inadvertent contact. Thorough hand-hygiene with soap and water or disinfecting agents
should be performed after direct contact with the site or materials that have come into
contact with the site to remove virus from the hands and prevent accidental inoculation
to other areas of the body (76 ). In addition, care should be taken to prevent contact of the
site or contaminated materials from the site by unvaccinated persons. The vaccination
site can be left uncovered, or it can be loosely covered with a porous bandage (e.g.,
gauze) until the scab has separated on its own to provide additional barrier protection
against inadvertent inoculation. An occlusive bandage should not be routinely used be-
cause maceration of the site might occur. Bandages used to cover the vaccination site
should be changed frequently (i.e., every 1–2 days) to prevent maceration of the vaccina-
tion site secondary to fluid buildup. Hypoallergenic tape should be used for persons who
experience tape hypersensitivity. The vaccination site should be kept dry, although nor-
mal bathing can continue. No salves or ointments should be placed on the vaccination
site. Contaminated bandages and, if possible, the vaccination site scab, after it has fallen
off, should be placed in sealed plastic bags before disposal in the trash to further de-
crease the potential for inadvertent transmission of the live virus contained in the mate-
rials. Clothing or other cloth materials that have had contact with the site can be
decontaminated with routine laundering in hot water with bleach (2,4 ).
Recently vaccinated health-care workers should avoid contact with unvaccinated
patients, particularly those with immunodeficiencies, until the scab has separated from
the skin at the vaccination site. However, if continued contact with unvaccinated patients
is unavoidable, health-care workers can continue to have contact with patients, including
those with immunodeficiencies, as long as the vaccination site is well-covered and thor-
ough hand-hygiene is maintained. In this setting, a more occlusive dressing might be
required. Semipermeable polyurethane dressings (e.g., Opsite®) are effective barriers to
vaccinia and recombinant vaccinia viruses (31 ). However, exudates can accumulate
beneath the dressing, and care must be taken to prevent viral contamination when the
dressing is removed. In addition, accumulation of fluid beneath the dressing can increase
the maceration of the vaccination site. Accumulation of exudates can be decreased by
first covering the vaccination site with dry gauze, then applying the dressing over the
gauze. The dressing should also be changed at least once a day. To date, experience with
this type of containment dressing has been limited to research protocols. The most
critical measure in preventing inadvertent implantation and contact transmission from
vaccinia vaccination is thorough hand-hygiene after changing the bandage or after any
other contact with the vaccination site.
VACCINATION METHOD
The skin over the insertion of the deltoid muscle or the posterior aspect of the arm
over the triceps muscle are the preferred sites for smallpox vaccination. Alcohol or other
chemical agents are not required for skin preparation for vaccination unless the area is
grossly contaminated. If alcohol is used, the skin must be allowed to dry thoroughly to
prevent inactivation of the vaccine by the alcohol. The multiple-puncture technique uses
a presterilized bifurcated needle that is inserted vertically into the vaccine vial, causing a
droplet of vaccine to adhere between the prongs of the needle. The droplet contains the
recommended dosage of vaccine, and its presence within the prongs of the bifurcated
needle should be confirmed visually. Holding the bifurcated needle perpendicular to the
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skin, 15 punctures are rapidly made with strokes vigorous enough to allow a trace of
blood to appear after 15–20 seconds (3 ). Any remaining vaccine should be wiped off with
dry sterile gauze and the gauze disposed of in a biohazard waste container.
EVIDENCE OF IMMUNITY AND VACCINATION-RESPONSE
INTERPRETATION
Appearance of neutralizing antibodies after vaccination with live vaccinia virus indi-
cates an active immune response that includes the development of antibodies to all viral
antigens and increased vaccinia-specific cell-mediated immunity. In a person with nor-
mal immune function, neutralizing antibodies appear approximately 10 days after pri-
mary vaccination and 7 days after revaccination (3 ). Clinically, persons are considered
fully protected after a successful response is demonstrated at the site of vaccination.
The vaccination site should be inspected 6–8 days after vaccination and the response
interpreted at that time. Two types of responses have been defined by the World Health
Organization (WHO) Expert Committee on Smallpox. The responses include a) major
reaction, which indicates that virus replication has taken place and vaccination was
successful; or b) equivocal reaction, which indicates a possible consequence of immunity
adequate to suppress viral multiplication or allergic reactions to an inactive vaccine
without production of immunity.
Major Reaction
Major (i.e., primary) reaction is defined as a vesicular or pustular lesion or an area of
definite palpable induration or congestion surrounding a central lesion that might be a
crust or an ulcer. The usual progression of the vaccination site after primary vaccination
is as follows:
• The inoculation site becomes reddened and pruritic 3–4 days after vaccination.
• A vesicle surrounded by a red areola then forms, which becomes umbilicated and
then pustular by days 7–11 after vaccination.
• The pustule begins to dry; the redness subsides; and the lesion becomes crusted
between the second and third week. By the end of approximately the third week,
the scab falls off, leaving a permanent scar that at first is pink in color but eventually
becomes flesh-colored (77 ).
Skin reactions after revaccination might be less pronounced with more rapid pro-
gression and healing than those after primary vaccinations. Revaccination is considered
successful if a pustular lesion is present or an area of definite induration or congestion
surrounding a central lesion (i.e., scab or ulcer) is visible upon examination 6–8 days after
revaccination (3 ).
Equivocal Reaction
Equivocal reaction, including accelerated, modified, vaccinoid, immediate, early, or
immune reactions, are defined as all responses other than major reactions. If an equivo-
cal reaction is observed, vaccination procedures should be checked and the vaccination
repeated by using vaccine from another vial or vaccine lot, if available. Difficulty in
determining if the reaction was blunted could be caused by immunity, insufficiently po-
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tent vaccine, or vaccination technique failure. If the repeat vaccination by using vaccine
from another vial or vaccine lot fails to elicit a major reaction, health-care providers
should consult CDC or their state or local health department before attempting another
vaccination.
MISUSE OF VACCINIA VACCINE
Vaccinia vaccine should not be used therapeutically for any reason. No evidence
exists that vaccinia vaccine has any value in treating or preventing recurrent herpes
simplex infection, warts, or any disease other than those caused by human
Orthopoxviruses (78 ). Misuse of vaccinia vaccine to treat herpes infections has been
associated with severe complications, including death (54,79,80 ).
VACCINIA VACCINE AVAILABILITY
CDC is the only source of vaccinia vaccine and VIG for civilians. CDC will provide
vaccinia vaccine to protect laboratory and other health-care personnel whose occupa-
tions place them at risk for exposure to vaccinia and other closely related
Orthopoxviruses, including vaccinia recombinants. Vaccine should be administered un-
der the supervision of a physician selected by the institution. Vaccine will be shipped to
the responsible physician. Requests for vaccine and VIG, including the reason for the
request, should be referred to
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention





SMALLPOX VACCINE FOR BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS
Although use of biological agents is an increasing threat, use of conventional weap-
ons (e.g., explosives) is still considered more likely in terrorism scenarios (81 ). More-
over, use of smallpox virus as a biological weapon might be less likely than other biological
agents because of its restricted availability; however, its use would have substantial
public health consequences. Therefore, in support of current public health bioterrorism
preparedness efforts, ACIP has developed the following recommendations if this unlikely
event occurs.
Surveillance
A suspected case of smallpox is a public health emergency. Smallpox surveillance in
the United States includes detecting a suspected case or cases, making a definitive
diagnosis with rapid laboratory confirmation at CDC, and preventing further smallpox
transmission. A suspected smallpox case should be reported immediately by telephone
to state or local health officials and advice obtained regarding isolation and laboratory
specimen collection. State or local health officials should notify CDC immediately at (404)
639-2184, (404) 639-0385, or (770) 488-7100 if a suspected case of smallpox is reported.
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Because of the problems encountered previously in Europe with health-care–associated
smallpox transmission from imported cases present in a hospital setting (82,83 ), health
officials should be diligent regarding use of adequate isolation facilities and precautions
(see Infection Control Measures). Currently, specific therapies with proven treatment
effectiveness for clinical smallpox are unavailable. Medical care of more seriously ill
smallpox patients would include supportive measures only. If the patient’s condition
allows, medical and public health authorities should consider isolation and observation
outside a hospital setting to prevent health-care–associated smallpox transmission and
overtaxing of medical resources. Clinical consultation and a preliminary laboratory diag-
nosis can be completed within 8–24 hours. Surveillance activities, including notification
procedures and laboratory confirmation of cases, might change if smallpox is confirmed.
Prerelease Vaccination
The risk for smallpox occurring as a result of a deliberate release by terrorists is
considered low, and the population at risk for such an exposure cannot be determined.
Therefore, preexposure vaccination is not recommended for any group other than labo-
ratory or medical personnel working with nonhighly attenuated Orthopoxviruses (see
Routine Nonemergency Vaccine Use).
Recommendations regarding preexposure vaccination should be on the basis of a
calculable risk assessment that considers the risk for disease and the benefits and risks
regarding vaccination. Because the current risk for exposure is considered low, benefits
of vaccination do not outweigh the risk regarding vaccine complications. If the potential
for an intentional release of smallpox virus increases later, preexposure vaccination
might become indicated for selected groups (e.g., medical and public health personnel or
laboratorians) who would have an identified higher risk for exposure because of work-
related contact with smallpox patients or infectious materials.
Postrelease Vaccination
If an intentional release of smallpox (variola) virus does occur, vaccinia vaccine will
be recommended for certain groups. Groups for whom vaccination would be indicated
include
• persons who were exposed to the initial release of the virus;
• persons who had face-to-face, household, or close-proximity contact (<6.5 feet or 2
meters) (84 ) with a confirmed or suspected smallpox patient at any time from the
onset of the patient’s fever until all scabs have separated;
• personnel involved in the direct medical or public health evaluation, care, or
transportation of confirmed or suspected smallpox patients;
• laboratory personnel involved in the collection or processing of clinical specimens
from confirmed or suspected smallpox patients; and
• other persons who have an increased likelihood of contact with infectious
materials from a smallpox patient (e.g., personnel responsible for medical waste
disposal, linen disposal or disinfection, and room disinfection in a facility where
smallpox patients are present).
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Using recently vaccinated personnel (i.e., <3 years) for patient care activities would
be the best practice. However, because recommendations for routine smallpox vaccina-
tion in the United States were rescinded in 1971 and smallpox vaccination is currently
recommended only for specific groups (see Routine Nonemergency Vaccine Use), hav-
ing recently vaccinated personnel available in the early stages of a smallpox emergency
would be unlikely. Smallpox vaccine can prevent or decrease the severity of clinical
disease, even when administered 3–4 days after exposure to the smallpox virus (2,4,85 ).
Preferably, healthy persons with no contraindications to vaccination, who can be vacci-
nated immediately before patient contact or very soon after patient contact (i.e., <3
days), should be selected for patient care activities or activities involving potentially
infectious materials. Persons who have received a previous vaccination (i.e., childhood
vaccination or vaccination >3 years before) against smallpox might demonstrate a more
accelerated immune response after revaccination than those receiving a primary vacci-
nation (3 ). If possible, these persons should be revaccinated and assigned to patient care
activities in the early stages of a smallpox outbreak until additional personnel can be
successfully vaccinated.
Personnel involved with direct smallpox patient care activities should observe strict
contact and airborne precautions (47 ) (i.e., gowns, gloves, eye shields, and correctly
fitted N-95 masks) for additional protection until postvaccination immunity has been
demonstrated (i.e., 6–8 days after vaccination). Shoe covers should be used in addition to
standard contact isolation protective clothing to prevent transportation of the virus out-
side the isolation area. After postvaccination immunity has occurred, contact precau-
tions with shoe covers should still be observed to prevent the spread of infectious agents
(see Infection Control Measures). If possible, the number of personnel selected for direct
contact with confirmed or suspected smallpox patients or infectious materials should be
limited to reduce the number of vaccinations and to prevent unnecessary vaccination
complications.
Children who have had a definite risk regarding exposure to smallpox (i.e., face-to-
face, household, or close-proximity contact with a smallpox patient) should be vacci-
nated regardless of age (20,52 ). Pregnant women who have had a definite exposure to
smallpox virus (i.e., face-to-face, household, or close-proximity contact with a smallpox
patient) and are, therefore, at high risk for contracting the disease, should also be vacci-
nated (52 ). Smallpox infection among pregnant women has been reported to result in a
more severe infection than among nonpregnant women (3 ). Therefore, the risks to the
mother and fetus from experiencing clinical smallpox substantially outweigh any poten-
tial risks regarding vaccination. In addition, vaccinia virus has not been documented to be
teratogenic, and the incidence of fetal vaccinia is low (52,63,86,87 ). When the level of
exposure risk is undetermined, the decision to vaccinate should be made after assess-
ment by the clinician and patient of the potential risks versus the benefits of smallpox
vaccination.
In a postrelease setting, vaccination might be initiated also for other groups whose
unhindered function is deemed essential to the support of response activities (e.g., se-
lected law enforcement, emergency response, or military personnel) and who are not
otherwise engaged in patient care activities but who have a reasonable probability of
contact with smallpox patients or infectious materials. If vaccination of these groups is
initiated by public health authorities, only personnel with no contraindications to vaccina-
tion should be vaccinated before initiating activities that could lead to contact with sus-
pected smallpox patients or infectious materials. Steps should be taken (e.g.,
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reassignment of duties) to prevent contact of any unvaccinated personnel with infectious
smallpox patients or materials.
Because of increased transmission rates that have been described in previous out-
breaks of smallpox involving aerosol transmission in hospital settings (1,82,83 ), poten-
tial vaccination of nondirect hospital contacts should be evaluated by public health
officials. Because hospitalized patients might have other contraindications to vaccination
(e.g., immunosuppression), vaccination of these nondirect hospital contacts should occur
after prudent evaluation of the hospital setting with determination of the exposure po-
tential through the less-common aerosol transmission route.
Contraindications to Vaccination During a Smallpox
Emergency
No absolute contraindications exist regarding vaccination of a person with a high-risk
exposure to smallpox. Persons at greatest risk for experiencing serious vaccination
complications are also at greatest risk for death from smallpox (20,52 ). If a relative
contraindication to vaccination exists, the risk for experiencing serious vaccination com-
plications must be weighed against the risk for experiencing a potentially fatal smallpox
infection. When the level of exposure risk is undetermined, the decision to vaccinate
should be made after prudent assessment by the clinician and the patient of the potential
risks versus the benefits of smallpox vaccination.
Infection Control Measures
Isolation of confirmed or suspected smallpox patients will be necessary to limit the
potential exposure of nonvaccinated and, therefore, nonimmune persons. Although drop-
let spread is the major mode of person-to-person smallpox transmission, airborne trans-
mission through fine-particle aerosol can occur. Therefore, airborne precautions using
correct ventilation (e.g., negative air-pressure rooms with high-efficiency particulate air
filtration) should be initiated for hospitalized confirmed or suspected smallpox patients,
unless the entire facility has been restricted to smallpox patients and recently vaccinated
persons (88,89 ). Although personnel who have been vaccinated recently and who have
a demonstrated immune response should be fully protected against infection with vari-
ola virus (see Evidence of Immunity and Vaccination-Response Interpretation), they should
continue to observe standard and contact precautions (i.e., using protective clothing and
shoe covers) when in contact with smallpox patients or contaminated materials to pre-
vent inadvertent spread of variola virus to susceptible persons and potential self-contact
with other infectious agents. Personnel should remove and correctly dispose of all pro-
tective clothing before contact with nonvaccinated persons. Reuseable bedding and cloth-
ing can be autoclaved or laundered in hot water with bleach to inactivate the virus (2,4 ).
Laundry handlers should be vaccinated before handling contaminated materials.
Nonhospital isolation of confirmed or suspected smallpox patients should be of a
sufficient degree to prevent the spread of disease to nonimmune persons during the time
the patient is considered potentially infectious (i.e., from the onset of symptoms until all
scabs have separated). Private residences or other nonhospital facilities that are used to
isolate confirmed or suspected smallpox patients should have nonshared ventilation,
heating, and air-conditioning systems. Access to those facilities should be limited to
recently vaccinated persons with a demonstrated immune response. If suspected small-
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pox patients are placed in the same isolation facility, they should be vaccinated to guard
against accidental exposure caused by misclassification as someone with smallpox.
In addition to isolation of infectious smallpox patients, careful surveillance of contacts
during their potential incubation period is required. Transmission of smallpox virus rarely
occurs before the appearance of the rash that develops 2–4 days after the prodromal
fever (3 ). If a vaccinated or unvaccinated contact experiences a fever >101 F (38 C)
during the 17-day period after his or her last exposure to a smallpox patient, the contact
should be isolated immediately to prevent contact with nonvaccinated or nonimmune
persons until smallpox can be ruled out by clinical or laboratory examination.
VIG for Prophylaxis and Treatment of Adverse Reactions
During a Smallpox Emergency
If vaccination of persons with contraindications is required because of exposure to
smallpox virus after an intentional release as a bioterrorism agent, current stores of VIG
are insufficient to allow its prophylactic use with vaccination. Because of the limited
stores of VIG, its use in such a scenario should be reserved for severe, life-threatening
complications (e.g., progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, or severe, toxic general-
ized vaccinia). If additional VIG becomes available in sufficient quantities to allow its
prophylactic use, VIG should be administered intramuscularly as a dose of 0.3 mg/kg
along with vaccinia vaccine to persons with contraindications who require vaccination.
RESEARCH PRIORITIES
Development and Evaluation of New Vaccinia Vaccine
Current supplies of vaccinia vaccine are limited to remaining stores of vaccine that
were produced before the discontinuation of production by Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., in
1981. Although viral titer evaluations have indicated that the vaccine has remained
potent, additional quantities of vaccine are needed to augment the current stores and
replace expired vaccine. Previous methods of vaccine production that used calf lymph
are no longer available; therefore, virus produced for use in a new vaccine must be
grown by using a Food and Drug Administration-approved cell-culture substrate. Any
new cell-culture vaccine should be evaluated for safety and efficacy by direct compari-
son with Dryvax by using appropriate animal models, serologic and cell-mediated immu-
nity methods, and cutaneous indicators of successful vaccination (major reaction).
Treatment and Prevention Alternatives for Vaccine
Adverse Reactions
Regarding alternatives to VIG for potential treatment and prevention of vaccine ad-
verse reactions, research priorities include a) evaluating antivirals for activity against
vaccinia virus by using in vitro assays and test animals that demonstrate vaccinia virus
pathogenicity, and b) developing and evaluating monoclonal antibodies against vaccinia
virus. Antivirals or monoclonal antibodies that demonstrate activity against vaccinia
virus in vitro and efficacy in protecting against dissemination of vaccinia virus among
test animals without compromising vaccine effectiveness could provide medical person-
nel with alternatives to VIG.
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GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
This MMWR\t provides recommendations regarding vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine. These recommendations were
developed by CDC staff and the Smallpox Vaccine Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP). The goal of this report is to provide guidance for the use of vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine in the
United States. Upon completion of this educational activity, the reader should be able to a) describe the
characteristics of the currently licensed vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine; b) identify groups recommended for routine,
nonemergency vaccination with vaccinia vaccine; c) list precautions and contraindications for the use of vaccinia
vaccine under routine, nonemergency conditions; and d) describe recommended infection control measures for a
suspected or confirmed case of smallpox.
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
1. What is the primary reason that routine vaccinia (smallpox) vaccination is not
recommended for the general public?
A. The frequency of adverse events following vaccination is unacceptably high.
B. The cost of vaccination programs prohibits routine vaccination.
C. The supply of vaccine is insufficient to meet demand.
D. Smallpox disease has been eradicated.
E. All the above are reasons that routine vaccinia vaccination is not recommended for the
general public.
2. Which of the following groups is recommended to receive vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine
under routine, nonemergency conditions?
A. All health-care providers.
B. Military personnel.
C. Laboratory workers who handle cultures containing a nonhighly attenuated strain of
vaccinia virus.
D. Emergency medical personnel (e.g., paramedics).
E. All the above groups are recommended to receive vaccinia vaccine under routine,
nonemergency conditions.





D. Severe allergic reaction.
E. Inadvertent inoculation.
4. Which of the following conditions is a precaution or contraindication for the use of
vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine under routine, nonemergency conditions?
A. Immunosuppression.
B. Severe allergy to a component of the vaccine.
C. Household contact with a person with eczema.
D. Pregnancy.
E. All of the above are precautions or contraindications to the use of vaccinia vaccine.
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5. Which of the following best describes the currently licensed vaccinia (smallpox)
vaccine?
A. Live attenuated smallpox virus.
B. Inactivated smallpox virus.
C. Live vaccinia virus.
D. Inactivated vaccinia virus.
E. Reassortant vaccine containing both vaccinia and smallpox viruses.
6. What is a critical measure in preventing contact transmission of vaccinia virus?
A. Thorough hand washing after contact with the vaccination site.
B. Isolation of the vaccinated person.
C. Use of a porous bandage to cover the vaccination site.
D. Antibacterial ointment applied to the vaccination site.
E. Application of the vaccine at an anatomic site normally covered by clothing.
7. For which of the following conditions is treatment with vaccinia immunoglobulin (VIG)
of no benefit?





8. What infection control measures are recommended for a person with suspected or
confirmed smallpox?
A. Isolation of the person in a negative-air pressure room.
B. Protective clothing for health-care workers in contact with that patient.
C. Vaccination of persons involved in direct medical care of suspected cases.
D. Monitoring contacts of suspected smallpox cases for febrile illness.
E. All the above infection control measures are recommended for a person with suspected
or confirmed smallpox.
9. At what point is a vaccinated person considered to be fully protected from smallpox?
A. Ten days after the first dose of vaccine, regardless of the response at the site of
administration.
B. Ten days after the second dose of vaccine, regardless of the response at the site of
administration.
C. After the appearance of any reaction at the site of administration.
D. After the appearance of a vesicular or pustular lesion at the site of administration.
E. After the appearance of a generalized rash in the vaccinated person.
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10. Indicate your work setting.
A. State/local health department.
B. Other public health setting.
C. Hospital clinic/private practice.
D. Managed care organization.
E. Academic institution.
F. Other work setting.
11. Which best describes your professional activities?
A. Patient care — emergency or urgent care.
B. Patient care — inpatient.
C. Patient care — primary-care clinic or office.
D. Laboratory or pharmacy.
E. Public health.
F. Other.
12. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for . . .  (Indicate all that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other uses.










15. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the characteristics of the currently
licensed vaccinia (smallpox) vaccine.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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16. After reading this report, I am confident I can identify groups recommended for routine,
nonemergency vaccination with vaccinia vaccine.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
17. After reading this report, I am confident I can list precautions and contraindications for
the use of vaccinia vaccine under routine, nonemergency conditions.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
18. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe recommended infection control
measures for a suspected or confirmed case of smallpox.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
19. The objectives are relevant to the goal of this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
20. The tables are useful.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree
E. Strongly disagree.
21. The figures are useful.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree
E. Strongly disagree.
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Correct answers for questions 1–9
1. D; 2. C; 3. E; 4. E; 5. C; 6. A; 7. C; 8. E; 9. D.
22. Overall, the presentation of the report enhanced my ability to understand the material.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
23. These recommendations will affect my practice.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.




C. Neither agree nor disagree.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
25. How did you learn about this continuing education activity?
A. Internet.
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